The Society of United Irishmen and the Rebellion of 1798 by Ridner, Judith A.
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1988 
The Society of United Irishmen and the Rebellion of 1798 
Judith A. Ridner 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the European History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ridner, Judith A., "The Society of United Irishmen and the Rebellion of 1798" (1988). Dissertations, 
Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625476. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-d1my-pa56 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
THE SOCIETY OF UNITED IRISHMEN AND THE REBELLION OF 1798
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Judith Anne Ridner 
1988
APPROVAL SHEET
Approved,
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
*x
CXm jUL
Author
May 1988
Thomas Sheppard
Peter Clark
James/McCord
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.................................................  iv
ABSTRACT.................................   V
CHAPTER I. THE SETTING................................................  2
CHAPTER II. WE WILL NOT BUY NOR BORROW OUR LIBERTY....................  19
CHAPTER III. CITIZEN SOLDIERS, TO ARMS!  ...........................  48
CHAPTER IV. AFTERMATH.................................................  76
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................... 87
iii
ABSTRACT
The Society of United Irishmen was one of many radical political 
clubs founded across the British Isles in the wake of the American and 
French Revolutions. First established as a reformist organization, its 
members sought to promote gradual changes in the political and social 
structures of Ireland. However, the ideological radicalization of the 
Society's leaders and the active suppression of openly reformist 
political activity by the Anglo-Irish government, drove the Society 
underground and transformed the United Irishmen into a close-knit 
military coalition of Protestants and Catholics ready to fight for the 
revolutionary cause of Irish independence.
As the culmination of nearly a decade of planning and careful 
negotiations with the French Directory for assistance, the Rebellion of 
1798 was a great disappointment to the United Irishmen. Although it was 
intended to be a great revolutionary upheaval of anti-British sentiment 
in Ireland, the Rebellion was little more than a series of isolated 
peasant insurrections across the Irish countryside. The Irish rebels 
were an unprepared, ill-equipped, and poorly trained match for the 
combined forces of the Anglo-Irish governments. With little real 
assistance from the French, they were defeated quickly by their British 
rivals. Although some political and social reforms followed, Ireland 
retained its "dominion status."
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THE SOCIETY OF UNITED IRISHMEN AND THE REBELLION OF 1798
CHAPTER I
The Setting
As one of the most visible events in the complex process of social 
and political transformation that swept Europe in the final decades of 
the eighteenth century, the French Revolution, like its predecessor, the 
American Revolution, was a model worthy of emulation for a whole 
generation of would-be reformers and political radicals across the vast
continent of Europe. Fuelled with the revolutionary ideals of
/  /  /
"liberte, egalite, f ratermte" and hopeful of financial and
military assistance from the French "mother-land," these political
radicals pushed forward with their long-held grievances and challenged
the ancient, yet delicate balance of monarchical Europe.
Ireland was one of the many places ignited by the fervor of foreign 
revolution. Like so many other small European states, Ireland was 
subsumed by a vast monarchical-parliamentary empire that dictated the 
political status and the socio-economic conditions of its people. To the 
Irish, America was a source of inspiration, while France offered them the 
possibilities of ideological guidance, financial sustenance, and military 
aid. The birth of modern Irish republicanism stemmed from an unwavering 
faith in the public actions and political ideologies of such 
revolutionary nations. The increasing radicalization of the Irish
2
3population resulted in a social and political crisis during the 1790s 
that "followed a similar pattern to that of many other countries with 
sizable revolutionary groups looking to France (and America) for support 
and inspiration."1
While the Irish republican movement of the 1790s may have 
represented a "general" European response to the French and American 
Revolutions, the events and the final outcome of the Irish rebellion of 
1798 were unique. In continental nations such as Poland or Belgium the 
radical minority encompassed only a small segment of the total 
population. For these nations, a successful revolt depended largely upon 
French military intervention. Ireland was one exception to the general 
rule. The Irish revolutionary movement was led by the Society of United 
Irishmen, a republican political society headed by an elite group of 
Protestant radicals who were actively supported by a majority, pro-French 
and pro-American, Catholic population.2 Although they were ultimately 
unsuccessful in their attempts at revolution, the United Irishmen not 
only rebelled with mass support, they also gained financial and military 
assistance from the French.
In the late eighteenth century, Ireland was an island colony whose 
social structure was marked by internal class divisions and political 
barriers. Great contrasts between wealth and poverty and between 
privilege and discrimination separated vast segments of Ireland's 
population from one another. With an already large and ever-increasing 
population, social tensions worsened and the existing gaps between Irish 
social classes widened. In just the years between 1750 and 1800 
Ireland's population grew by almost fifty percent. While in 1767 there
4were approximately two and a half million Irishmen, by 1800 there were 
close to four and three-quarter million— a number that accounted for 
almost one-third of the total population of the British Isles.
Naturally, such rapid growth placed considerable pressure upon Ireland's 
social and political structures.3
Despite the increases in population, class distribution remained 
unequal. The Irish social structure was pyramidal in shape with a very 
broad base that narrowed to a sharp point on the top. Irishmen were 
divided into three distinct socio-economic classes. There was little 
social mobility or interaction between the various groups. The rights of 
political power and land ownership were reserved largely for an elite 
class of Anglo-Irish referred to as "the ascendancy.” While this 
centuries-old Anglican aristocracy made up approximately one-tenth of the 
total population, they owned nearly five-sixths of the land, occupied 
most government positions, and controlled the Irish Parliament in Dublin. 
In Ireland, land ownership meant political power and social status for a 
small number of privileged "gentlemen."4
Ireland's version of a middle-class encompassed a wide range of 
incomes and occupations. While most men were Protestant businessmen or 
merchants (particularly the Presbyterian merchants and linen 
manufacturers of Ulster and Dublin)r lawyers, doctors, and other 
professionals were also included in this category, as were some 
well-to-do farmers. Although this group reflected a great diversity of 
interests and talents, many were enlightened men of considerable 
education and some wealth. Perhaps more importantly, these men stood 
mid-way between the great extremes of Irish wealth and poverty. While
5they were only second-hand witnesses to the injustices suffered by 
Ireland's peasants, they themselves endured the economic and political 
discrimination of Ireland's ruling agrarian elite. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that these men formed the bulk of Ireland's radical leaders 
and were the first to call for reform and ultimately revolt.3
The Roman Catholics made up the remaining three-quarters of 
Ireland's population. As the members of a "conquered" race, and 
"speaking a language that was despised, professing a religion that was 
abhorred," these Irish natives "found themselves in many cases slaves, 
even in the bosom of written liberty."6 Although these three million 
people formed the mass of Ireland's population, they were regarded as 
strangers to the dominant Anglo society. They had few civil or criminal 
rights, were legally barred from holding public office, and were largely 
relegated to lowly careers as artisans, cotters, and laborers. Irish 
uprisings during the American Revolution resulted in certain political 
concessions from the Anglo-Irish government that included a law that 
permitted Catholics to own their own land. Unfortunately, increasing 
land values meant that very few men could afford to take full advantage 
of this privilege. Instead, the overwhelming majority of Ireland's Roman 
Catholics lived as impoverished peasants.7
While legal restrictions barred Irish Catholics from most forms of 
active public participation in their society, social conditions deprived 
them of high economic status. As peasants, they were usually subject to 
the eccentricities of an Anglo-Irish landlord, who all too often behaved 
as "a sort of despot who yielded obedience. . .to no law but that of his 
will."8 Isolated from his tenants by differences in language, religion.
6and national allegiance, the landlord saw his estate only as a lucrative 
source of income. Such mercenary attitudes placed added economic 
pressures upon tenet farmers.9 Besides the inherent economic 
uncertainties associated with a dependency upon agricultural production, 
Ireland's rural masses were also burdened by a sharp rise in tithe rates 
and rent levels and increased governmental duties on leather, whiskey, 
beer, and tobacco from the mid 1780s until 1797. For the average 
peasant, the combination of these factors meant little if any surplus 
cash each year and only aggravated his already chronic state of 
poverty.10
Ireland's peasants knew few, if any, material comforts. Accustomed 
to squalid and unsanitary living conditions, even the clothes they wore 
were generally ragged. Poverty created a clothing shortage in Ireland 
that was remedied with second-hand imports. While this was a source of 
inexpensive clothing, such dirty imports also brought various diseases 
into Ireland.11 Housing conditions were no better. Most Catholics 
resided in small one-room dwellings or cabins that often housed more than 
one family. The traveller Arthur Young referred to such structures as: 
"the most miserable looking hovels that can well be conceived."12 These 
buildings generally consisted of mud walls, thatched roofs, a single 
chimney, and one door to allow for the circulation of some light and air 
to the interior. Starkly furnished, even beds were rare commodities in 
such dwellings. Instead, in most cases "the family lay on straw, equally 
partook of by cows, calves, and pigs."13
As a colony of England, it is no surprise that Ireland's social and 
economic development lagged behind that of her European neighbors.
7Ireland remained overwhelmingly dependent upon traditional techniques of 
production. The existing linen industry still operated on a cottage 
basis.with flax being woven in the homes of peasants on an intermittent 
basis.14 Most importantly, Irelands*s colonial economy was only one 
piece of the larger British mercantilist system. As a result, protective 
legislation was placed upon those goods (such as linen and wool) that 
would best supply the ever-expanding British economy.13 For Ireland 
this meant that she "was not allowed to trade directly with any other 
nation, but was forced to receive her supplies and necessities of life 
directly from Great Britain, so that the English people could alone be 
the recipients of all profits."16
When compared to the industrial progress made by many other European 
nations, Ireland was economically primitive. The prevalence of small 
farms made it difficult to apply the latest agricultural technologies. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of absentee landlords made room for an 
exploitive group of middlemen in Ireland. Concerned only with profit, 
these men would lease large amounts of land directly from the landlord 
and subsequently sub-let it to peasants at extraordinarily high rents.
As a result, the general lack of capital among peasants worsened and the 
absence of any merchant or middle class in the Irish countryside meant 
that peasants had little incentive to change.17 Even Ireland's leading 
industries of brewing, distilling, linen, and wool manufacture were based 
upon agricultural products. Although economic output was increasing in 
the late eighteenth century to meet the needs of a growing population, 
Ireland remained largely a country of poor and uneducated peasants.18 
Many of Ireland's more fortunate men recognized the economic and social
8backwardness of their nation and knew that it must be corrected soon.
With shame for Ireland and scorn for England, these men readily admitted 
that economic opportunities were few and "the lower order of the people" 
of their land had "less means of being enlightened than the same class of 
people in any other country."19
It is not surprising that Ireland's governing structure virtually 
mirrored the actions and intentions of the dominant British system based 
in London. After all, as a colony inhabited by a majority population of 
disenfranchised Roman Catholics, it was vitally important for the English 
to remain firmly in control. Only the outcries of the Irish for 
political freedom and their accompanying threats of violence during the 
American Revolution prompted the passage of the Constitution of 1782, 
which granted the Irish government greater legislative and judicial 
independence from England. While this document bestowed great privilege 
upon Ireland's Parliament, it offered them little real responsibility or 
change in their "dominion" status.
In theory, the Irish Parliament of the 1790s had the power to 
regulate its own internal affairs, conduct its own foreign policy, and 
impose its own custom tariffs— in practice, such power was negligible at 
best. Although the British Parliament could no longer legislate for 
Ireland, the royal veto and a very powerful influence over Ireland 
remained. Without an Irish ministry or executive body that was directly 
responsible to the Irish Parliament, more often than not, the combined 
strength of the British Parliament and the King's Privy Council managed 
to guide, if not control most actions and ideological stands taken by the 
Irish government. While the Lord Lieutenant and Chief Secretary were the
9Irish equivalents of the British Prime Minister, they were Englishmen 
appointed and instructed by British government. Unattached to the Irish 
Parliament, these men could be easily and quickly dismissed by the 
British government if they granted too many concessions or were too 
sympathetic to pleas of the Irish colonials.20
By the end of the century, the religious, economic, and social 
barriers that separated Irish Presbyterians from Catholics were weakened 
greatly. The combination of higher duties on consumer goods, the almost 
universal opposition to the tithe, and the increased revenues needed by 
the British government to finance the war with France produced a clear 
set of grievances that were shared by Catholic and Presbyterian alike.
The tithe in particular, was a constant source of agitation. As the 
theoretical right of the Church of England to one-tenth of the fruits of 
the earth, in practice the tithe was not only a burdensome tax, but was 
also an important factor considered when land was bought or sold, or when 
rents were fixed. Naturally, Catholics and Presbyterians resented paying 
for a church to which they did not belong and were aggravated at the 
random manner in which tithes were set and collected.21
While the tithe was and had been a matter of considerable anger and 
controversy, it was the French Revolution that finally fused Ireland's 
two diverse religious groups into a single, anti-British coalition. Like 
the many other "oppressed" masses of Europe, it was the triumph of the 
French bourgeoisie that "inspired the advocates of change in all parts of 
the British Isles with verve," and gave them "a sense of being 
participants in a great European drive against tyranny and anachronistic 
privilege." But most importantly, it assured the Irish "that their cause
10
would soon triumph."22
Ireland may have lagged behind her fellow European nations in 
social, economic, and political development, but a very active oral 
culture brought the events and the ideological principles of the American 
and the French Revolutions directly to the minds and hearts of the Irish 
masses. Aside from middle-class literary and political societies 
designed to popularize and promote the "republican way," Ireland had a 
very active and politically diverse press. This meant that revolutionary 
political ideas were widely disseminated among the broad range of the 
Irish citizenry. Daily reports of the struggles and triumphs of the 
revolutionaries bound the middle-class merchants of Ireland to their 
bourgeois counterparts in America and France.23
With over sixty-five Irish newspapers in print in the early 1790s, 
the press played a central role in the dissemination of information to 
the people. In the Irish crusade for reform and later revolt, the 
distribution of printed pamphlets and newspapers helped to mobilize the 
people. After all, it was in the daily press releases that "the French 
revolution" like the earlier American Revolution, "burst upon the 
world. . .presenting images of blood and disorder, but coming as the 
messenger of harmony and freedom to the afflicted nations."24 The 
ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity spread quickly among the 
general population. Particularly as the French Revolution progressed and 
the people rejected both king and the Constitution of 1791, it became 
clear to enthusiastic observers in Ireland that "all ranks and degrees, 
all classes and descriptions of persons, the high and the low, the rich 
and the poor, the learned and the ignorant, the old, the young, and the
11
middle-aged, all rejoiced and were exceedingly glad."25
While, in Ireland "the people and the press emulated each other in 
their congratulations, and in their praises and glorifications of France, 
and of the French people," they also recognized that this momentous 
overthrow of established authority had broad historical significance.26 
Most importantly, the model of the successful revolt in Catholic France 
convinced many Irish Protestants that their fellow Roman Catholic 
countrymen were not as "unfit for liberty" as they had assumed 
previously. The shared economic and political grievances of the "Irish 
people" and the need for mass support eased many Protestant reformers 
into "what previously would have been considered an unnatural alliance 
with the Catholics."27 Even the bloodletting of the Reign of Terror and 
the anti-British sentiment that characterized France during the war 
years, could not discourage the Irish in their unwavering and idealized 
faith in the Revolution. Throughout the 1790s, their actions and beliefs 
were guided by an "excessive sense of optimism in French goodwill."28
While the Irish had battled against the political, economic, and 
social repression of the Anglican aristocracy for decades, it was the 
tales of the American and French Revolutions that illuminated their long 
list of grievances and pushed them to action. Like the many other 
nations of Europe that witnessed these important historical events, 
Ireland "became animated by a new-born vigour. . .and, as if awaking from 
a long slumber, imagined that they had discovered in the old social bonds 
the shackles that enslaved them."29 Such models of successful 
revolution, inspired the Irish to organize themselves around a solid 
program of reform and revolution. While the American Revolution
12
encouraged reform, it was the French Revolution that "changed in an 
instant the politics of Ireland."30 While only a few years previously 
Ireland had been politically lethargic and socially disorganized, by 1790 
the Irish were infused with a renewed sense of public spirit. A frenzied 
urgency accompanied the daily news from France. Theobald Wolfe Tone, a 
founder of the United Irishmen and later their ambassador to France, was 
one of the most interested and excited observers of the time. He 
summarized the sentiments of many of his fellow countrymen when he 
remarked that since "we well knew, experimentally, what it was to be 
enslaved, we sympathised most sincerely with the French people, and 
watched their progress to freedom with the utmost anxiety."31
From the beginning of the revolt in America in 1776 and in France in 
1789, the Irish were ideologically and emotionally tied to their 
revolutionary "compatriots" and suffered both their setbacks and 
triumphs. To the Irish, these revolutions created a spell that "rendered 
them more and more impatient of their grievances, and prompted them to 
more energetic exertion, to break asunder every link of the chains by 
which they felt themselves galled."32 A bond of understanding, 
compassion, and many shared social circumstances united the Irish 
middle-classes to their bourgeois "brothers" of America and France. As 
an example of such sentiments, Bastile Day was celebrated in Belfast on 
July 14 of 1790 and 1791, "with an indescribable enthusiasm, never 
witnessed there on any occasion before nor since."33 Participants 
carried banners that bore the likenesses of Franklin and Mirabeau. One 
person even held an illuminated globe "on which the New World, America, 
was represented as shedding a blaze of light on the Old World,
13
Europe.”34 While this commemoration of American and French achievements 
symbolized Ireland's sympathy for her fellow men, more importantly, July, 
1790 marked "the first open demonstration of the political sentiments of 
the leading spirits of republicanism" that played a crucial role in Irish 
politics throughout the 1790s.35
To a nation whose masses were held in check by class distinctions 
and economic restrictions, the American and French Revolutions were 
idealized symbols of national achievement. They offered Irishmen the 
hope that tyranny, despotism, and corruption could be swept away and 
representative government and financial opportunity instituted in their 
place. The Irish observed first-hand how the initiation of increased 
social and political rights was translated into a new sense of national 
unity in America and France. As social divisions worsened and taxes and 
tithes continued to rise, increasing numbers of Irishmen were convinced 
that they, like their fellow revolutionaries, could shape the destiny of 
their nation.36
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CHAPTER II 
We Will Not Buy Nor Borrow Our Liberty
For a nation such as Ireland, where political participation and 
economic opportunity were reserved for the privileged few, the American 
and French Revolutions were far more than isolated events of the North 
American or European continents. Rather, such momentous defeats of 
monarchical authority marked turning points in the histories of England, 
France, and all the nations of Europe. The revolutionary notion that 
"the people" could triumph over the social oppression and political 
corruption of an aristocratic elite inspired dehate, reform, and finally, 
open rebellion in Ireland. With the American Revolution as their 
inspiration and the French Revolution as their example, radical members 
of Ireland's "middle-class" organized their ranks and mobilized mass 
support around the issues of Parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation, 
and the abolition of tithes, in the hopes that open revolt against 
England and Irish independence would be the eventual result.
The French Revolution in particular, had an immediate impact upon 
Irish politics. It was in the early and very critical years of the 
Revolution, from 1789 to 1791 that various political radicals and social 
reformers merged to form the Society of United Irishmen. Not 
surprisingly, this radical political organization of Protestants and
19
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Catholics whose ultimate origins lay in the political aftermath of the 
American Revolution, borrowed its "character and principles as well as 
its actual foundation" directly from "the reformist, universalist and 
republican ideals of the French Revolution."1
Founded first in Belfast in 1791 and in Dublin in 1792 (see map 1), 
the Society of United Irishmen began as one of many reform associations 
that sprang to life in the midst of the public uproar over the American 
and French Revolutions. As one part of a larger network of British 
radical organizations centered in London, the Society drew many of its 
ideological principles and political methods from its counterparts in 
England and Scotland.2 However, The Society of United Irishmen quickly 
distinguished itself as the "most radical and most influential of all the 
British political clubs generated by the reform euphoria of the 1790s"3 
with its calls for an Irish revolution with French assistance. Unlike 
the United Irishmen, the demands of most British radical organizations 
were not consciously revolutionary. Rather, they sought far more 
traditional reforms of Britain's long-standing political and social 
institutions.4
As the most publicly conspicuous and socially influential political 
organization of eighteenth-century Ireland, the United Irishmen had a 
self-appointed duty to Ireland that they took very seriously. As a 
result, they attracted "a membership impressive in wealth, intellectual 
ability, and social standing."3 The Society drew many of its leaders 
from among the most qualified and well-educated men of Ireland's business 
and professional classes. In its first years, the Dublin club claimed 
that there were over 360 men "admitted" to their Society. Of the total
21
of 360, there were approximately 200 active members and an average 
meeting attendance of 50-90 men. While some members came from the 
professional class of lawyers or barristers, the majority of the Dublin 
Society, like the other clubs, consisted of successful tradesmen, cloth 
merchants, and textile manufacturers whose businesses suffered from the 
economic ill effects of the British mercantilist system.6 Of those 200 
active members, there were 80 reported Protestants and 73 Catholics.
This proportion is typical of most clubs. Despite Ireland's
overwhelmingly Catholic population, the bulk of the United Irish 
leadership in these early years came almost exclusively from the urban 
Protestant classes of Dublin or Belfast.7
While the most urbanized, affluent, and well-educated Protestants 
monopolized the leadership of the United Irishmen, the Society still
enjoyed a substantial popular following among many Protestants and
Catholics of the Irish countryside. Because clubs existed in Armagh, 
Clonmel, Gorey, Limerick, Lisburn, Nenagh, Sixmilewater, Templepatrick, 
and Tullamore as well as in Belfast and Dublin, the Society's membership 
extended to a broad range of Irish society.8 However, their influence 
remained particularly strong in the more prosperous regions of the north, 
east, and midlands and in the suburban areas in and around the cities of 
Belfast and Dublin. Membership increased in number and strength in the 
more modern, commercialized towns and cities of Ireland, where better 
roads and increased commerce meant improved communication networks that 
facilitated the dissemination of information about the Society and its 
political ideologies.9
From the founding of the first club in 1791, the Society's leaders
22
were intent upon the organization of a cohesive public force in an effort 
to create “a general union of sentiment among the various classes" of 
Ireland "upon whose co-operation they were to depend."10 Their goal was 
to bring all Irishmen together, regardless of economic class or religious 
persuasion, to form a united front of opposition to British policies and 
practices. To do so, the United Irishmen played upon the strong 
anti-British sentiment that already existed among so many of their fellow 
citizens. Always stressing the importance of Irish national pride, the 
Society was ultimately successful in its attempts, because it brought 
Irishmen together in small, organized groups in which "Protestants and 
Catholics— all religious sects, forgot their prejudices and nobly rallied 
under one common standard— the standard of the nation."11
As Ireland's primary reformist political organization of the early 
1790s, the stated goals of the United Irishmen included fairly moderate 
calls for changes in the structure and intent of Irish politics and 
society. In these early years, the Society's leaders publicly labelled 
themselves as republicans "in the manner of the classical republicanism 
of the English 'country' or 'real Whigs.'" They "accepted monarchy" in 
theory, but "sought to curb the powers of central government, to preserve 
fundamental liberties, and to secure religious toleration."12 They felt 
a great sense of social responsibility towards Ireland and her people.
The masthead of the Society's newspaper the Northern Star summarized 
such feelings when it proclaimed in 1791, "The Public Will our Guide— The 
Public Good our End."13
At this time, the social and political objectives of the United 
Irishmen were quite simple and very straightforward. After considerable
23
deliberation and debate among Society leaders, the United Irishmen
decided upon a public platform that would attract the greatest number of
Irishmen to their cause. Their plan included calls for Parliamentary
reform. Catholic emancipation, and the reduction or peaceful elimination
of English influence in the Irish government.14 With nearly three
million Irishmen excluded from active political participation, the United
Irishmen recognized that there was a great reservoir of social power that
lay dormant in Ireland. The possibility of such a social force at their
disposal only encouraged the United Irishmen. It meant that the issue of
a property qualification for the franchise was dismissed quickly by the
Society. Instead, full support was put behind a public platform that
called for universal manhood suffrage and Catholic emancipation in
addition to a reform of Parliament.13 The Dublin club summarized what
they felt were the beliefs of all Irishmen when they stated:
The great object of this Society is a real 
representation of the Irish Nation in an Irish 
Parliament; and as friends of the whole People, we 
support the necessity of Catholic emancipation as a 
means of making representation what it ought to be,
Free, Equal, and Entire.16
The creation of an independent Irish republic was not an openly 
stated goal in the first years of the Society, despite the convictions of 
many United Irish leaders. After all, such founders as Theobald Wolfe 
Tone and James Napper Tandy were ardent and radical republicans.17 Tone 
readily admitted that he "was a Democrat from the very commencement" and 
characterized his friend Tandy as "a very sincere republican."18 Dr. 
William Drennan, one of the founders of the Dublin club, had written as 
early as 1791 that the Society would have "the Rights of Hen and the 
Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number as its end," but "Real
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independence to Ireland, and Republicanism" would be "its particular 
purpose."19 Led by a group of political radicals who felt close 
ideological ties to the French and American revolutionaries, the 
Society's shift to more overtly radical republican policies was virtually 
inevitable. Many members of the United Irishmen recognized early on, 
that Parliamentary reform and Catholic emanicipation were touted as the 
objects of their organization only to gain mass backing and to pacify 
their more moderate supporters. In reality, the "real Purposes" of the 
United Irishmen "were to separate Great Britain from Ireland, and to 
subvert the present Constitution."20
As the French Revolution progressed, the news of its events formed 
an increasingly large and important part of the daily lives of Irishmen. 
Greater numbers of Irishmen imitated the French style of manners and 
dress and a National Guard was formed in Dublin.21 In light of the 
French accomplishments, English power appeared far less formidable than 
ever before. While it was not spoken of openly, the possibility of a 
successful Irish revolt loomed in the future. To many United Irishmen, 
it was clear that the time was ripe for a substantial change in the 
Society’s public platform, for "political questions, both foreign and 
domestic, and the enacting of several unpopular laws, had advanced the 
minds of many people, even before they were aware of it, towards 
Republicanism and Revolution."22
The Society's relatively moderate calls for reform no longer suited 
the restless mood of Ireland. Archibald Hamilton Rowan, secretary of the 
Dublin club, reported that as the United Irish movement spread among the 
general public, policies took on a life of their own. While calls for
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Parliamentary reform and Catholic emancipation had initially answered the 
demands of most United Irishmen, soon "nothing less than separation from 
England would satisfy some of the leaders (and the followers), who 
thought this might be accomplished by the assistance of France."23 
Plans for an independent Parliament with legislative membership open to 
Irishmen of all religious persuasions was no longer enough to satisfy 
many. Instead, as the sense of national pride and purpose expanded, the 
notion of an independent Ireland became increasingly important to Society 
members. As the self-appointed representatives of Ireland, the United 
Irishmen responded with a vow that: "We will not buy or borrow liberty 
from America or from France, but manufacture it ourselves, and work it up 
with those materials which the hearts of Irishmen furnish them with at 
home."24
It was upon the outbreak of war between France and England in 
February 1793 that the public character of the United Irishmen underwent 
a gradual but significant transformation from a club of urban social 
reformers into a "militantly anti-English, anti-monarchical republican 
movement" that was the direct result of "the reaction of a general 
European crisis upon the peculiar historical situation in Ireland."25 
Compounded by the already unsettling events of the Revolution, the 
political and social disruptions of war were enough to finally change the 
United Irishmen "from a small and ineffectual group of radical reformers 
. . .into a secret, oath-bound and hierarchical organization led by 
ardent republicans" and finally "into an armed and mass insurrectionary 
levy, prepared to act in an auxiliary role to French invasion forces."26
In the eyes of most Irishmen, the war of the First Coalition drew
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clear battle lines between the despotic monarchies of Europe and the 
noble republic of France. Never before had the United Irishmen's call of 
"Citizen Soldiers, to arms!" elicited such an emotional response from 
their fellow countrymen.27 Within the Society it was a commonly held 
belief that "every man should become a Soldier in the defence of his 
rights."28 To those United Irishmen who were already committed to the 
ideals of republicanism, if not the notion of full Irish independence, 
the grand nation of France was undoubtedly innocent of all possible 
wrongdoings. Upon the outbreak of hostilities in 1793, the Dublin 
Society publicly decreed that: "This Society is convinced that this war
would never be carried on, if it did not tend to effectuate a treaty, or 
rather a conspiracy, entered into by tyrants and abettors of tyranny."
To the members of a nation battling against British colonial authority 
and political oppression, it appeared that, "France had committed no 
crime, unless the emancipation of 24 millions of men be one."2®
In the wake of this great European crisis, nothing appeared "more 
natural" and "more seasonable” to the United Irishmen than that "those 
(Irishmen) who had common interests, and common enemies, who suffered 
common wrongs, and lay claim to common rights, should know each other, 
and should act together."30 Yet, the Society still faced the dilemma of 
how to translate their specific political goals and ideologies into a 
more general formula that was attractive to the mass of Ireland's poor 
and uneducated peasants. While they had the active support of Ireland's 
middle-classes, many United Irishmen wisely recognized that "there was a 
fund of strength and indignation in the Irish people," (particularly 
among the lower classes of Roman Catholics), "which, if skillfully
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directed, would vanquish every obstacle."31 In order to achieve the 
mass mobilization necessary to create a revolution. Society leaders 
needed to channel the long-held anger and resentment of the nationfs 
Roman Catholics into the energy of their organization.32
In an effort to create a substantial national following, the Society 
of United Irishmen reorganized and redefined the structure and intent of 
their organization. Between 1794-1796, the Society took its efforts to 
become a more radical political-military organization underground. To 
hide their efforts from the increasingly attentive Anglo-Irish 
authorities, the existing clubs were subdivided into smaller and more 
flexible units that each elected a secretary and a treasurer. To achieve 
a more efficient military structure, a hierarchical system of committees 
was established on the local, regional, and national levels. In 
imitation of the new French system, the committees were governed by a 
General Executive Directory of five elected officials.33
While from behind the scenes, the Society was restructured to 
prepare for increased civil and military activity, from the public 
perspective, the character of the United Irishmen also changed. In an 
effort to attract greater numbers of the peasantry to their cause, public 
policies were modified. To their platform of issues, the Society added a 
campaign to abolish tithes and a general vow to improve the economic 
conditions of Ireland’s laboring man.34 Furthermore, political 
concessions made to the Catholic majority by an increasingly nervous 
Anglo-Irish government assisted in the radicalization of the 
organization. In particular, the Catholic Relief Bill of April 1793 that 
gave Ireland's Roman Catholics the right to bear arms, greatly helped the
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United Irishmen mobilize and militarize their ranks of Catholic
supporters.33 By 1796, the United Irishmen had successfully convinced
large segments of the Irish population that they were the sole protectors
and defenders of their liberty. To a young man of Ulster, during this
time it appeared that:
In every part of the kingdom, societies of United 
Irishmen were organized; and all my brothers. . .as
well as myself were enrolled as members; whilst
arms, including pikes, were collected and 
manufactured, and carefully concealed.36
Meanwhile in France, the years between the outbreak of war with 
England in 1793 and the year 1796 were marked by an increasingly 
aggressive foreign policy. To the United Irishmen and the many other 
radical organizations in existence across the European continent, the 
most important manifestation of this policy was the November 1792 decree 
in which France offered "fraternity and assistance to all people wishing 
to recover their liberty."37 Although this policy of active 
intervention was later modified by the French government upon the advice 
of Georges Jacques Danton, it nonetheless dictated the tone and intent of 
Franco-United Irish relations until 1798.
The United Irishmen interpreted this decree as the equivalent of a 
direct offer of financial and military assistance from the French. In an 
organization that already supported the ideology of the Revolution, this 
French promise only reconfirmed the underlying republican tendencies of 
the Society's leaders. Motivated by such general assurances from the 
French, the United Irishmen launched on a determined quest for an 
independent Irish state even when "interference in neutral countries was 
entirely ruled out by the French (leaders). If the subjects of an enemy
29
rebelled, France would support them: but she could not be expected to 
foot the bill for the preliminary revolutionization."38 This made 
little difference to the United Irishmen, who flocked to Paris in these 
early years to promote and even plead their cause to the French.38
1792 marked the opening phase of Franco-United Irish relations. 
Encouraged by the anti-British war propaganda running rampant in Ireland 
and by the pro-revolutionary policies of France, the United Irishmen 
looked increasingly to France as a potential source of financial and 
military aid. Ideological guidance was no longer sufficient to sustain a 
nation mobilized for insurrection. Instead, the Irish radicals needed 
tangible support from the French to carry out a successful revolt against 
England. At the same time in France, the political leaders first began 
to view the United Irishmen as a potentially powerful and highly 
lucrative political force that could be employed as an effective weapon 
against their English enemies.
In the Paris of the early 1790s, many Irish radicals-in-exile 
pressured the French government to consider the desperate situation of 
Ireland and the possibility of direct intervention. The French leaders 
finally conceded to Irish wishes and sent an American, Lieutenant Colonel 
Eleazer Oswald to survey the situation in May 1793.40 After a tour of 
the nation and meetings with various officials including Lord Edward 
Fitzgerald,41 Oswald concluded that "though there was plenty of
discontent in Ireland there was little likelihood of a popular rising in
the immediate future."42 While his pronouncement was a great
disappointment to the United Irishmen, it was not his statement, but the
internal French political crisis of the Reign of Terror that temporarily
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terminated the first diplomatic exchanges between France and the United 
Irishmen.
As their organization grew larger and more radical, the United 
Irishmen were increasingly determined in their pursuit of French approval 
and support. In Paris, the workings of long-time Irish exile Nicholas 
Nadgett, an intelligence officer in the French admiralty, convinced the 
French leaders to restore their dialogue with the United Irishmen. In 
January 1794, upon the urgings of Madgett, the Committee of Public Safety 
sent William Jackson as their agent to Ireland.43 While there, he was 
to gauge the English response to a French invasion of Ireland and to 
"ascertain the state of public opinion in Ireland, in order to determine 
whether it would be desirable to invade that country."44
Jackson was a typical example of the many Irish exiles in residence 
in France. He was of Irish descent, but had begun his career as a tutor 
in London. Later, he became an Anglican clergyman and acted as the 
personal companion and chaplain to the Duchess of Kingston. In 1790, 
swept up by the fervor of the French Revolution, Jackson emigrated to 
France where he played an active role in their new government. Upon his 
arrival in England in 1794 as emissary to Ireland for the French 
government, Jackson renewed an old friendship with a London attorney 
named John Cockayne. He hired Cockayne as a travelling companion and 
guide, unaware that his friend was a loyal Englishman prepared to act as 
a spy for Pitt and the British government.45
Jackson was not greeted warmly upon his arrival in Dublin in April 
1794. With the British government becoming increasingly aggressive in 
its pursuit of United Irishmen, many United Irishmen suspected that
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Jackson was a British spy and refused to meet with him. Others, such as 
Lord Edward Fitzgerald, had doubts about French intentions and insisted 
that the Irish should make the first effort at revolt, utilizing the 
French only as allies and not liberators.46 Only Hamilton Rowan, 
secretary of the Dublin Society, was confident of Jackson and his 
mission. Rowan agreed to meet with him from his cell in Newgate, where 
he was imprisoned on sedition charges. In their discussions, Jackson 
assured Rowan that "if the people of Ireland were inclined to reform the 
abuses of their government by a declaration of independence, that the 
French government would assist them in any way they might prefer," and 
most important to the Irish, "would desire no further interference."47
Encouraged by the meeting. Rowan convinced his friend and fellow 
United Irish leader, Theobald Wolfe Tone to compose an official statement 
on the current state of Ireland for the Committee of Public Safety.
Tone's essay presented a general survey of the contemporary social and 
political conditions in Ireland. While he confirmed that a French 
invasion "of sufficient force" would be supported by a majority of the 
Irish people, he also spoke of the need to send an "official" United 
Irish representative to Paris.48 Tone later recounted the night that he 
composed this fateful letter. He had gone home that evening and "made a 
sketch of the state of Ireland. . .and the inference" of his paper "was, 
that circumstances in Ireland were favorable to a French invasion."49
After transcription by Rowan, the letter was delivered to Jackson. 
Forewarned of the dangers of the royal mail, Jackson was foolish and 
mailed the letter anyway. Thanks to the work of Cockayne, the letter was 
intercepted by the British government and Jackson was arrested in April
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1794. At his trial in 1795 he was convicted of treason by an Anglo-Irish 
court. However, he died from a suicidal dose of arsenic while he stood 
in the dock and awaited the sentence of the death penalty.30
Naturally, the disappointing end to the Jackson mission was a great 
blow to the hopes of the United Irishmen. While it caused the active 
suppression of the organization by the British government, the Jackson 
letter also implicated Rowan on charges of treason and encouraged him to
devise his escape from prison and subsequent flight to the United
States.51 More importantly, the Jackson affair temporarily sabotaged 
the newly-established relations between the French and the United Irish.
Although it was clear to most United Irishmen that the French leaders
would respond favorably to Irish pleas for military and financial 
assistance in the future— how far in the future remained an unanswered 
question.32
While the cessation of diplomatic relations with the French upset 
many United Irishmen, the Jackson affair coincided with, and even 
accelerated the consolidation and further radicalization of the Society. 
Many of the more conservative members were scared away by the British 
threats that accompanied the arrest and trial of Jackson. Those members 
who remained were a small, but highly dedicated group of republican 
radicals. These men "were totally committed to the policy of soliciting 
a French invasion of Ireland" in the hopes of creating an independent 
Irish state.53 Driven underground by the active pursuit of the British 
government, the Society publicly adopted the more radical and 
revolutionary ideologies of its leaders as its official political 
policies.
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By 1796, the transformation and militarization of the Society was 
nearly complete. The United Irishmen were more prepared than ever before 
to support a French invasion of Ireland. Their leadership was organized 
into a tight hierarchical structure. They had gained the support of 
large numbers of Ireland's peasants with their calls for Catholic 
emancipation, universal suffrage, and the abolition of tithes. 
Furthermore, in 1796 the United Irish absorbed the Catholic agrarian 
organization, the "Defenders" into their ranks. This move not only 
enlarged membership, it also furthered the cause of religious unity and 
"brought to the society a deeply rooted tradition of agrarian violence, 
and an intense hatred of the established government" at Dublin Castle.54 
Diplomatically, the events of the previous three years, including the 
many discussions with the French government and the missions of Oswald 
and Jackson, convinced the United Irishmen that France was fully 
committed to assisting in their future rebellion against England. "Given 
every reason to think that France was eager to supply military 
assistance," the United Irishmen mobilized their ranks, gathered weapons, 
and plotted possible courses of action.55
The reorganization and enlargement of the United Irishmen occurred 
in spite of Anglo-Irish efforts to eliminate what they considered to be a 
growing amount of "politically submissive" behavior throughout the 
British Isles. Particularly in Ireland, the Jackson affair and the 
accompanying rumors of a French invasion, scared many officials Dublin 
Castle. It appeared that quick action was necessary to counteract the 
efforts of such groups as the United Irishmen. Consequently, two bills 
were passed that regulated behavior at public political protests. The
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Treasonable Practices Bill of 1795 modified the existing treason law to 
include anyone who intended harm to the King, plotted to assist foreign 
invaders, or sought to intimidate the Houses of Parliament in speech or 
writing. In the same year, the Seditious Meetings Bill was also passed. 
This law gave local magistrates discretionary control over any public 
meeting of fifty or more people and required prior notice to be given 
before any such meeting occurred.56
While these laws were aimed at combatting the fervor of reformist 
political activity across the British Isles, other acts passed by the 
Irish Parliament were directed specifically at the activities and 
practices of the United Irishmen. The Insurrection Act of 1796 made it a 
capital offense to administer an illegal oath or an oath that bound a 
person to a seditious society. Also in 1796, the Habeas Corpus Act was 
partially suspended. This move allowed the government to detain those 
persons suspected of treasonable activities with a warrant authorized by 
the Lord Lieutantent or Chief Secretary. Also at this time, the yeomanry 
was organized. They would assist the army in the event of an invasion 
and act in the capacities of a police force. The Irish Parliament was 
becoming increasingly reactionary and repressive in response to pressure 
from the British government. The activities of the United Irishmen had 
to be stopped. Yet, these laws had just the opposite effect. Although 
many Irishmen were arrested and prosecuted for their treasonable 
behaviors, these laws only made the United Irishmen more determined to 
further their cause and more selective of how, when, and where they would 
move next.57
At the same time, France's governing body was also restructured. In
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1795, a five-man Directory was established as France's principal 
governing body. Under the Directory, French foreign policy was guided by 
the personal motives and goils of the individual Directors. As a result, 
policy often lacked cohesion and consistency. Only a chronic shortage of 
funds, an increasing concern for military strategy and power politics, 
and a general belief that Europe might be republicanized, provided a 
certain amount of uniformity.58 The liberation of Ireland was a small 
and insignificant matter to the French Directors. Before 1796,French 
leaders were curious about the Irish situation, but remained firm in 
their conviction to avoid any direct support for the early stages of 
foreign revolution. The French temporarily quelled theever-insistent 
pleadings of the Irish exiles in Paris by sending first Oswald, then 
Jackson to Ireland to assess the political climate. However, the French 
refused any real commitment of their troops or money to Ireland.
Changes in the European political situation in 1796 focused the 
attention of the French Directors upon Ireland. Angered by the 
underhanded English support of the civil war in the Vendee, the 
possibility of an Irish invasion appeared to be the best way for France 
to strike a decisive blow against England. It was then, for the first 
time, that "Ireland assumed an important place in French strategy."39 
With revenge against England as the object of their mission, the French 
planned an invasion of Ireland co-ordinated with a raid into Wales as the 
best way to accomplish their goal. It was the "desire for revenge" among 
many Frenchmen that made Ireland "a special case, and the logistical 
difficulties of supplying and maintaining military support at a distance" 
that made "a swift victory more necessary and a full-scale invasion more
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likely in Ireland than in any other country with a strong internal 
revolutionary movement."6 0
1796 was the first year of the three-year Franco-United Irish 
partnership. At this time, France agreed to begin official discussions 
with the United Irishnen about the details of a French invasion. Upon 
the opening of quasi-official diplomatic relations between the two 
groups, the United Irishmen had to try to convince the French of exactly 
how, when, and on what terms this revolution should take place. The 
United Irishmen were particularly concerned that France would not only 
agree to sponsor their rebellion, but would also pledge to honor 
Ireland's independent status after it was accomplished. In spite of 
their seemingly good intentions, most French leaders held little regard 
for the political and social ramifications of an Irish revolution. In 
reality, they sought the most attractive and least expensive way to 
destroy the British. They were willing to sponsor a rebellion in Ireland 
only for their own benefit and any such war would be executed on French 
terms and under French command. France's ultimate goal was "to deal a 
mortal blow to England's war plans with the minimum of effort on her own 
part."61
To mark the start of their revolutionary partnership, Theobald Wolfe 
Tone travelled to Paris as the official United Irish representative to 
France. While there, he met with the Director Lazare Carnot, Charles 
Delacroix, the French Foreign Minister, and General Henri Jacques 
Guillaume Clarke.62 Carnot was the most adamantly anti-English of the 
French Directors and welcomed the plans for an Irish revolution in the 
hopes that it would be England's "Vendee."63 Clarke and Delacroix were
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more moderate in their intentions. They believed that French assistance 
should be on a smaller scale and agreed to supply the Irish rebels with 
arms, ammunition, and money, but no invasion forces. With a successful 
revolt dependent upon a full-scale French expeditionary force, this offer 
was totally unacceptable to the United Irishmen.64
Tone faced a tough diplomatic battle in Paris. While the Directors 
agreed "to take up the business of Ireland in the strongest possible 
manner that circumstances would possibly admit," their offer of some 
thirty pieces of cannon, 20,000 stand of arms, and some money was still 
not sufficient.65 To convince Clarke and Delacroix of their critical 
need of French assistance, Tone initially based his argument upon 
ideological assurances. He promised the French that he "had no doubt 
whatever that, if we succeeded, we would establish a Republic," and 
expounded upon the Society's long-term commitment to revolution.66
More than the purity of Irish intent. Tone had to convince the 
French that a full-scale invasion and accompanying revolution in Ireland 
would bring them considerable material rewards. In this respect, his 
argument was solid and convincing. He asserted boldly that the United 
Irishmen were so widely supported that the Irish masses would flock to 
assist French invasion forces intent upon the establishment of a 
republic. Tone added that the formation of an independent Irish republic 
would deprive England of vital resources and manpower, while the French 
would gain a loyal ally, a trading partner, and a strategic-military 
advantage over her rival Britain.67
Thanks to Carnot's intense hatred of England and a lingering spirit 
of "republican internationalism" among the French Directors, Tone's
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exercise in secret diplomacy was a success.68 The Directory agreed to 
"send an expeditionary force to Ireland with the aim of liberating that 
country and reducing England to the rank of a second-class power."69 
Two detachments of troops would sail from Brest to Galway with 
approximately 11,000 men. At the same time, three detachments of 
European recruits would sail from Holland to join the expedition. The 
United Irishmen gladly accepted this proposal only after it was clearly 
understood that the French "should come as Allies, to act under the 
Directions of the projected Revolutionary Government." Fearful of future 
debts, they also insisted that the French were to "be paid the Expenses 
of the Expedition, and their Troops receive Irish Pay whilst they acted 
here."70 With apparent confirmations by the French, the mission was 
underway.
High hopes for the future revolt accompanied the French invasion 
forces that sailed from Brest in December 1796. The mission was under 
the command of Lazare Hoche, one of France's most distinguished generals. 
He was accompanied by an excited Theobald Wolfe Tone, dressed in full 
French military uniform.71 Their force of 45 ships was "well provided" 
with weapons, according to Tone. Upon departure, they carried 
approximately 41,160 stands of arms, 20 pieces of field artillery and 9 
of seige, 61,200 barrels of gun powder, 7,000,000 musket cartridges, and 
700,000 flints.72 However, there were reasons for caution upon 
departure. Tone knew that the French Navy had been badly hit by the 
purges of the Revolution. It suffered from the losses of many of its 
best trained aristocratic officers, its ships had undergone long periods 
of neglect and disuse, and morale was low following a number of defeats
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at the hands of the British.73
Although the expedition sailed from France to Ireland without
British interception, bad weather drove them off their intended course
✓
and separated General Hoche on the frigate Fraternite from the main 
body of ships (see map 2). One group of ships finally made its way into 
Bantry Bay, a small inlet on the south-west coast of Ireland that was far 
south of the intended destination of Galway (see maps 2 & 3). Despite 
such difficulties, the commanders decided to land and lay seige to the 
south-west city of Cork with the 6,500 available troops (see map 2).
This plan of action was doomed from its inception, for severe winter 
storms prevented them from landing.74 A British naval officer observed 
that conditions were "so extremely bad, thick, rainy, and blowing hard," 
that it was "impossible for them to attempt landing troops or indeed 
doing any Thing."75 Tone sadly recognized the desperate state of their 
mission and exclaimed: "I see nothing before me, unless a miracle be
wrought in our favour, but the ruin of the expedition, the slavery of my 
country and my own destruction."76 After sixteen days of bad weather, 
the fleet withdrew and sailed again for France— their mission of 
revolution an utter failure.77
The fiasco of Bantry Bay was the first of several failed French 
missions that sailed before 1799 in the hope of "liberating Ireland" from 
the British.78 In France and Ireland, the men involved reacted to the 
news of the disasterous expedition with a mixture of disappointment and 
frustration. The French considered the Bantry Bay excursion as an 
embarrassing failure and a waste of men, munitions, and money. Napoleon 
Bonaparte, in command of the army of Italy, believed that those troops
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should have been sent to him. It was clear to most Frenchmen that "Hoche 
had gained nothing from this gamble."79 Pressured by public outrage and 
disappointment, the Directory "re-imposed its standing policy on 
intervention abroad."80
Although the failure of the Bantry Bay expedition was a great 
disappointment to the United Irishmen, most members refused to accept 
that an successful rebellion against England did not form a large and 
signficant space in Ireland's future. After all, by 1796, the hope for 
an independent Ireland was no longer the secret plan of several United 
Irish leaders. In the five years since its inception, the Society of 
United Irishmen had not only grown in numbers and in strength, it had 
also restructured itself on a close-knit hierarchical basis, and had 
become openly radical and revolutionary. Supported by a fairly 
significant segment of the Irish peasantry and hopeful of continued 
assistance from France, the United Irishmen continued their calls for 
revolution.
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CHAPTER III
Citizen Soldiers, To Arms!
As the year 1798 unfolded and disastrous events of Bantry Bay in 
1796 faded to little more than a bad memory in the minds of most men, the 
Society of United Irishmen and their growing number of followers 
reorganized their ranks and faced the future with a renewed sense of hope 
and optimism for the cause of a wholly independent Ireland. Their 
anticipation was not without warrant, for before them loomed both the 
beginning and the end of their long awaited struggle for Irish liberty. 
This was to be an eventful year. For years afterward, it was remarked 
that "Never was there an era in the history of any country which, in so 
short a space of time, gave birth to such numerous and varied 
circumstances as did the memorable year 1798 in Ireland."1
While Bantry Bay represented a dismal failure of the past relations 
between the United Irishmen and France, many men remained firmly 
committed to the idea of an Irish revolution supported with and supplied 
by French military and financial assistance. Even those few United 
Irishmen who "wished to accomplish a Revolution in this country (Ireland) 
without the intervention of the French," agreed that "they would join 
the French" because they knew their goal could not be achieved without 
outside help.2 It was a widely held belief among most United Irishmen
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that French intervention was imperative if full independence from England 
was to be actually achieved.
Bantry Bay had provided several valuable lessons. By 1798, the 
United Irishmen knew that they were dependent upon an "Irish populace" 
that was nothing more than "an agricultural population, full of vigor, 
burning for the conflict, and long inured to the habits of 
insurrection."3 Although the intentions of the general population were 
noble; as the men who would form the mass of the rebel infantry, they 
lacked professional weapons, military discipline, and battlefield skill. 
The United Irishmen presumed that the presence of the French on Irish 
soil, would not only supply the necessary military leadership and weapons 
to fuel a rebellion, but would also lend ideological cohesion and a 
strong sense of purpose to the fight. As a result of many internal calls 
for renewed action towards revolution, the Directory of the United 
Irishmen decided to restore its diplomatic relations with the French.
As part of the United Irishmen's most determined effort to solicit 
money, arms, and military leadership from the French, they resolved to 
establish an even more structured line of communication and 
correspondence between themselves and the French Directory. To do so, a 
resident United Irish Minister to Paris was appointed. Edward John 
Lewins, a Dublin attorney and prominent Catholic member of the United 
Irishmen was selected to be the first such representative. He was sent 
to Paris in April 1797 under the assumed name of Thompson, "to act as the 
Minister of the Irish Republican Directory at Paris."4 In June of the 
same year, he was joined by a second United Irish "messenger," Dr.
William James McNevin. Together, they were to plead the cause of liberty
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in Ireland in the hope that once again the French would offer their 
assistance.
While Lewins and McHevin worked in Paris, preparations for the revolt 
were underway in Ireland. By early 1798, the United Irishmen and their 
many followers considered themselves to be fairly well prepared for a 
revolt of substantial magnitude. While they still lacked the essential 
military leadership, weapons, and considerable financial support needed 
to wage a successful revolt, they had high hopes that their French 
"compatriots'* would come to their rescue in the end. Most importantly, 
they had inspiration. The United Irishmen were particularly successful 
in cultivating a belief among their fellow countrymen that "the people 
alone are the fountain of all just power, and that to their freely chosen 
delegates belongs the right of exercising authority over the nation."3 
The organization had done a first-rate job of infusing the Irish masses 
with a strong sense of anger at their present conditions, while at the 
same time it instilled them with the hope of a bright future under United 
Irish leadership. To the United Irishmen, it seemed that few of their 
fellow men could resist their optimistic predictions for a new Ireland. 
They felt that they offered something for everyone. While "they (the 
United Irishmen) promised to the Presbyterians an irrestible lure, that 
of over-turning the Constitution, and of raising a Republic on its 
ruins," to the Catholics they hinted at "a rich and splendid 
establishment of a Popish Hierarchy under the protection of the French, 
provided they joined them in establishing a Republican form of 
Government."6
The rebellion was scheduled to begin on May 23, 1798. By April, the
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United Irishmen felt that all of Ireland was ready to wage a substantial 
fight against the British. In reality, only isolated regions were 
prepared for such a revolution. The province of Ulster was one such 
region (see map 1). As the stronghold of the organization, there were 
reported to be upwards of 100,000 men ready to take the field in Ulster 
in defense of their national liberty. Hore importantly, these men were 
sufficiently equipped and fairly well trained. This was perhaps the only 
area where the men were actually supplied with pikes, muskets, other 
firearms, and even had some cannons and ammunition. Despite Ulster's 
readiness, most rebels across Ireland remained unprepared and 
ill-equipped to wage a battle of any significant proportions.7
Unfortunately, the rebellion that was launched on May 23, 1798 was 
not the "great revolutionary upheaval" that was originally planned. It 
began as scheduled in Dublin and the nearby counties of Wexford and 
Wicklow and quickly spread eastward into Leinster and north to Ulster 
(see map 1). However, this was by no means the "national rising" that 
the United Irish leaders intended, "in which the popular 
forces,. . .joined by many Irish soldiers in the government ranks and 
supported by France, would overwhelm the demoralized adherents of a 
discredited regime."8 Instead, information leaked to the Anglo-Irish 
government about the planned insurrection resulted in the arrests of 13 
members of the Leinster Directory and 3 national Directors of the United 
Irishmen in March 1798. This action deprived the United Irishmen of 
their primary structure of leadership in the two crucial months before 
the rebellion and only aggravated the unpreparedness of the rebel ranks. 
Those United Irishmen next in line had to scramble to take control
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quickly, even though they were unprepared for the duty. As a result, 
operations were poorly coordinated and somewhat disorganized. Most 
importantly, fighting was confined to those wealthier counties of the
north, east, and south, where support for and participation in the United
Irishmen had always been the strongest.9
Despite many events that did not go according to plan, the rebellion
of 1798 was a revolt of significant proportions. By its conclusion 
several months later, it was estimated that approximately eighty thousand 
of those involved were killed— fifty thousand rebels and thirty thousand 
on the side of England.10 Fighting was reported to be fierce. The 
rebellion was the ideal opportunity for Irishmen to vent their long-held 
anger upon their English oppressors. It was the rebels who were most 
often blamed for every destruction of property, pillaging of land, or 
death of an innocent person that occurred. By the summer and fall of 
1798, it was said that "the midland and southern counties" were 
"distinguished in barbarity, resorting, in addition to murder and 
robbery, to the ancient practices of burning the corn and houghing the 
cattle of those against whom their rage was directed."11 It seemed that 
all over Ireland, "massacres in cold blood— house burnings— military 
executions— whole districts depopulated— tortures— flagellations, 
submersions, and imprisonments, appeared on every side."12
By all accounts, large areas of Ireland were in a state of chaotic 
upheaval. Anglo-Irish newspapers and periodicals of the time were filled 
with tales of death and destruction from both sides. The British were 
particularly interested in the accounts of what they considered to be the 
"evil" deeds of the Irish rebels. While many of these stories were based
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upon truths, they were often exaggerated to fuel anti-Irish sentiment 
among loyalists. There were tales of conspiracies between blacksmiths 
and carpenters who had been supplied with iron and wood to make pikes for 
the rebels. In Ireland, a common fear circulated among many wealthy 
landowners that servants had been contracted by the rebels to kill their 
masters in exchange for the permanent possession of their estates once a 
republic was established.13 The involvement of women was regarded with 
particular distaste by the loyalists. One English newspaper noted that 
"the fanaticism which unhappily pervades the greater part of Ireland, 
appears to have reached even the female sex. A lady,. . .actually put on 
the green, or rebel uniform, marched in the ranks of the insurgents, and 
shot several men with her own hand."14 While the rebels "proceeded in 
no gentle way in many neighbourhoods" took "money, arms, and property" 
and stained "their progress. . .with the blood of many innocent people," 
they were by no means solely responsible for the many atrocities 
committed against their fellow countrymen.15 A gentleman recalled that 
"the intruments employed of death and torture, though dissimilar, were 
alike destructive: the bullet, sabre, bayonet, lash, and halter" were
"met by the pike, the scythe, the blunderbuss, the hatchet, and the 
firebrand."16
With the rebellion underway, it appeared to outside observers that 
the United Irishmen had "fully organized its form and political 
existence" to form a substantial force to be reckoned with by the 
British.17 The reality of the rebel situation was quite different.
There was only a small contingent of rebel leaders who coordinated some 
of the operations. Much of the actual fighting was carried out
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independently of Society leaders by the peasants of Ireland, who had 
strong ties to their land and numerous loyalties to their fellow 
countrymen.18 As participants in a rebellion that offered them the hope 
of secured lands and full political rights, these men assembled 
themselves into poorly armed, and largely unguided mobs that faced their 
opponents bravely, motivated only by the most immediate and tangible 
objectives. While they had the might to "sweep forward with the 
irresistible and frightening force of a confident, determined crowd," 
they were also easily discouraged by any and all failures, no matter how 
small.19
Although it seemed that "the whole Irish nation, with the exception 
of persons pre-corrupted by the English Government, was animated by the 
same spirit" of revolution,20 support was not really so widespread. It 
was reported that the rebels resorted to recruiting many "volunteers" by 
force, because they desperately needed to increase their fighting ranks. 
There were stories of how farmers were attacked by United Irishmen in 
their homes at night and threatened with death if they did not take the 
oath of secrecy and join their fellow countrymen in revolt.21 
Nonetheless, the United Irishmen and their fellow rebels did have certain 
distinct advantages that they used wisely to achieve several early 
victories over their Anglo-Irish opponents. They knew how to play upon 
the pro-rebel sympathies of some of the governmental troops stationed in 
Ireland. They were also accustomed to Ireland's wild and mountainous 
terrain and used such knowledge to launch successful surprise attacks on 
the British.22
In the long run, the disorganized, poorly equipped, and largely
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untrained rebels were no match for the combined forces of the British and 
Irish governments. From the start of the revolt in May 1798, the Irish 
administration responded with several decisive measures designed to quell 
the fighting and restore law and order to Ireland as quickly as possible. 
On May 24, 1798, martial law was declared. Issued by the Lord Lieutenant 
of Ireland, Lord Camden, this decree threatened "to punish all persons 
acting, aiding, or in any manner assisting in the Rebellion which now 
exists in this Kingdom."23 While the imposition of martial law did put 
a damper on some revolutionary activities when it was carried out 
properly, governmental troops often abused its tenets to inflict revenge 
upon their opponents. It was said that "the commercial exchange of 
Dublin formed a place of execution; even suspected rebels were every day 
immolated as if convicted on the clearest evidence."24
Governmental forces quickly asserted their superiority on the 
battlefield, despite the guerilla-like tactics of the Irish rebels.
After all, the Anglo-Irish government had a considerable military force 
at its disposal that was designed to combat the rebels, maintain internal 
order, and defend against possible French invasion forces. With 4,600 
regular cavalry, 2,600 regular infantry, 2,000 fencible cavalry, 1,800 
fencible infantry, 25,000 militiamen, and 40,000 yeomen stationed in 
Ireland in 1798 they simply out-numbered their opponents.25 They were 
also trained, clothed, and armed. Their only disadvantage was that many 
of their members were not the most respectable or well educated Irishmen. 
The yeomanry was a source of considerable trouble. Because Ireland had 
so many absentee landlords, this force was drawn largely from a class of 
Irishmen who had little education or experience, and no family titles.
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During the insurrection, they rose in rank quickly and in "their new 
charecters, they bustled and bravadoed; and sometimes from mere 
ignorance, and sometimes in the certainty of party support or public 
indemnity, they overleaped the bounds of law."26
i
Faced with a rebellion that was dying quickly, the United Irishmen 
were both baffled and angered by the lack of response from their 
"compatriots" in France. After all, military and financial assistance 
from the French had been a prerequisite for the rebellion, they were
simply unaware of more recent political developments in France.
Dispatches sent from Paris to Ireland in October 1797 had reaffirmed 
French intentions following Bantry Bay. The first of these messages 
contained a renewal of the "former assurances of friendship and support 
given by the Directory of the French Republick." The second "announced 
that the projected invasion of Ireland would be made in the month of 
April 1798" to correspond with the native rebellion scheduled for May 23, 
1798.27
Encouraged by such assurances, the United Irishmen had few reasons
to doubt the sincerity of the French in the days before the outbreak of
the rebellion. Naturally, the failure of the French to arrive in April 
puzzled the United Irish leaders and promoted a sense of confusion and 
indecision within the rebel organization. In Paris, the first reports of 
the fighting and the early rebel successes arrived in mid-June, 1798. 
Those United Irishmen still in France immediately petitioned the French 
Directory for aid to their fellow countrymen.28 On July 14, 1798, the 
Directory finally issued a statement on the Irish situation that offered 
the rebels little hope of assistance. The French noted that although
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"the Irishmen who were fighting for all Europe were worthy of honour" and 
"should be supported," the Directory was "very conscious how little 
effective help could be sent."29
The foreign policy of France had undergone major revisions since 
Ireland's receipt of the October 1797 dispatches. These changes 
reflected other alterations in the balance of internal political power in 
France. As leadership in the Directory changed from one group of men to 
another and as General Napoleon Bonaparte gained more political clout 
with each of his military victories, policy priorities were reassessed. 
While in the past, the French had never demonstrated any real desire "to 
send any force to Ireland, except such as, from its magnitude, might not 
only give them the hopes of conquering the Kingdom, but of retaining it 
afterwards as a French conquest," an invasion of Ireland had always 
offered them the hope of destroying their enemy, Great Britain.30 
However, by 1798, Ireland was no longer the only strategic possibility.
As a result, the Irish rebellion floundered without their much-needed 
foreign assistance.
Since the fall of 1797, the military-strategic balance on the 
European continent had shifted in France's favor, so that by 1798, France 
was in the position to select both the time and place for the decisive 
strike against Great Britain. Their original plan focused solely upon a 
full-scale invasion of Ireland in which they would make landings at 
several points along the Irish coast to distract the British government 
and to urge uprisings across the country. However, this plan was never 
put into action. At the last minute, the Directory was advised by 
Napoleon Bonaparte {now commander of the Army of England) and Talleyrand
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(successor to Delacroix as the Minister of Foreign Affairs) not to risk a 
channel invasion. Consequently, preparations for the mission were 
suspended.31 Instead, with little consideration for the cause of Irish 
independence, it was decided that Napoleon would lead the French Army of 
the East on a massive invasion of Egypt. This campaign sailed on May 19, 
1798, just before the scheduled Irish rebellion was about to begin. The 
attack on Egypt was a move designed to threaten Britain's economic 
resources in India and gain France an alliance with the Ottoman Sultan.
In reality, it did little to weaken England and only reactivated the war
in the Mediterranean and opened the way for a Second Coalition.32
Guided by the words of Napoleon and involved in the preparations for 
the Egyptian campaign, "French officals ignored the strategic 
possibilities inherent in a blow against British power in Ireland."33 
With all attentions focused upon the actions in the Mediterranean, the 
outbreak of the Irish revolt in May, 1798 was at first regarded by the 
French as a minor incident. Interested only in the military-strategic 
balance of Europe, the French saw little need to support an internal 
class struggle. What very few officials in the French government
realized was that a large-scale invasion of Ireland would have been no
more costly than their ill-fated campaign in Egypt. Only later did some 
men acknowledge that Ireland could have proven to be a far greater threat 
to Great Britain. While it was unlikely that an Irish republic would 
have been created, a long French occupation of Ireland would have 
deprived England of many economic resources and would have given the 
French Directory an excellent bargaining chip to use against their rival 
in later negotiations.34 It appeared that Napoleon was to blame for
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such mistakes. Many in Ireland believed that:
at no period in his life was Napoleon Bonaparte known 
to favor a descent on Ireland. The cause of this 
disinclination was believed to be because the 
Executive Directory of the United Irishmen would 
never agree that Ireland should become a dependency 
of France. All their negotiations were based upon 
the principle that Ireland was to be aided and 
regarded as an ally, and when independent, and 
recognized in that character, the French government 
to be paid for whatever aid of men or money it should 
have furnished.33
Upon the receipt of the news of the early victories of the Irish 
rebels, the French Directory took a more active interest in the events of 
Ireland. In a June 20, 1798 meeting between Theobald Wolfe Tone (now the 
official United Irish representative in Paris) and General Kilmaine 
(Napoleon Bonaparte's replacement as commander of the Army of England), 
it was explained that the French Directory was not anxious to invade 
Ireland, particularly since Napoleon had left behind few available troops 
or supplies for such a mission.36 However, after continued reports of 
rebel successes and somewhat exaggerated tales of their strength, the 
members of the Directory decided that France should at least encourage 
the Irish rebels by sending munitions and a few thousand available 
troops. The French hoped that just their presence would provide "a 
strong enough force. . .to create a formidable revolutionary army by 
adding disciplined striking power to numbers and enthusiasm."37
By mid-July, 1798, the French plans to invade Ireland and assist the 
rebels were nearly finalized. The Directory placed General Louis Cherin 
in overall command of what would be three separate expeditions to Ireland 
transporting a total of 8,000 French troops. As it was planned, three 
frigates under General Jean Joseph Humbert would sail from La Rochelle
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with 1,000 troops. General Jean Hardy would follow him from Brest with 
another 2,400 men on seven ships. General Cherin would sail with the 
remaining troops only after the other two had landed safely in Ireland. 
However, problems doomed the French mission from its inception. They 
began when the government did not allot the necessary funds to supply the 
expeditions until July 22, 1798 and the money never arrived. After 
several weeks and the transfer of General Cherin to the Army of Italy, 
Humbert, with the smallest force, managed to secure enough money to start 
the mission from the pay-master of La Rochelle. He finally sailed from 
that port on August 6, 1798.38
General Humbert, now second in command to Hardy of France's rag-tag 
"l'araee d'lrlande" was advised to land his troops in Donegal, in a port 
on Ireland's north-western shore. Once he and his troops disembarked, 
they were to surround themselves with Irishmen known for "their devotion 
to liberty" and to set up provisional governments with civil and military 
functions in those towns under French control.39 Instead, Humbert and 
his troops reached Killala Bay (south of Donegal) by the middle of August 
(see maps 3 & 4). They sat off of the Irish coast for two days and 
waited for a convienent time to disembark. Humbert's three frigates were 
spotted by British lookouts, who at first thought that they were English 
ships. A boat carrying five men was launched from the Irish coast to see 
if these "English” ships needed supplies, but when neither boat nor men 
returned, a call of alarm was issued.40 When the French finally 
attempted to land on August 22, 1798, the Irish yeomanry was there to 
stop them. However, the French overwhelmed them in a minor skirmish and 
went on to take control of the town of Killala.
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Once in command of the town, Humbert and his troops marched to the 
Bishop's palace, took prisoners of the Bishop and his two sons and raised 
the green flag of "Erin go Bragh" in a symbolic request to the local 
Irishmen to join them in the fight against England.41 He then issued a 
proclamation of French intentions that assured the Irish "that the French 
came in the quality of allies, to deliver, and not to conquer 
Ireland."42 Instead, the French sought to unite the men from both 
nations and "march to glory," because, as Humbert stated, the French 
"swear the most inviolable respect for your property, your laws, and all 
your religious opinions; be free, be masters of your own country, we look 
for no other conquest than that of your liberty, no other success than 
yours."43
Despite such words of assurance, it was clear from the start that 
the French intended to be in full command of all military operations in 
Killala. While they claimed to have come from France to bolster Irish 
courage, share their dangers, and sacrifice their lives "in the sacred 
cause of Liberty," in reality, the French saw themselves as a "Band of 
Heroes," sent "to deliver you (Ireland) from the hands of Tyrants."44 
More importantly, the French would be Ireland's mentors. They would 
"teach you (Ireland) the arts of war, and to despise the low pursuits of 
toil and industry." They would raise the Irish peasants from their lowly 
social status to a new height where they too could "live on the spoils of 
war and the labours of others."49
The French soon discovered that Killala was not the best choice for 
their landing. As part of the poorest province in Ireland (Connacht, see 
maps 1 & 3), it was no surprise that Killala and the surrounding region
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of county Mayo were both unorganized and unprepared for rebellion. 
Furthermore, because the United Irishmen had little to no following in 
this rural, agricultural area of Ireland, few people had even heard much 
news of the revolt raging in the east. As part of a close-knit domestic 
economy, the people of Killala lived simple existences as the tenants of 
wealthy landowners.46 There was little time left for political 
organization. Rather, in most families "the men fed the family with 
their labor in the field, and the women paid the rent by spinning."47 
Uninformed and somewhat uninterested, it was no wonder that the 
"immediate reaction of the country people to the French landing seems to 
have been bafflement."48
While the Irish leaders of the rebellion hoped that the arrival of 
the French upon Irish soil would add enough momentum to rekindle the 
dying rebellion in the east, the early events in Killala offered them 
little hope of success. According to the agreements made in Paris, the 
French brought the Irish their much-needed engineers, artillery men, and 
officers, along with weapons and ammunition. The United Irishmen 
promised to provide the required man-power. It was accepted by both 
sides, that if the French supplied the field leadership and necessary 
supplies, the Irish peasants would form the mass of the infantry.49 In 
Paris, the United Irishmen had assured the French that upon their arrival 
"instantly all the patriots capable of serving would hasten to the French 
colours."50 Instead, once Humbert and his troops were in Ireland, they 
found that only a few local United Irishmen and about 800 volunteers were 
willing to leave their fields at harvest time and join them in revolt.
Most of the Irishmen that joined the French were a military
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liability. These peasant "insurgents" needed to be fully armed, clothed 
in uniform, and drilled. With only a very limited time available to 
them, the French could do little to educate the Irish in the use of 
professional arms and had to accept their undisciplined behavior and 
unreliable attitudes.51 The French were shocked by the poverty that 
characterized the population of County Mayo (see map 3). They were also 
angered by the peasants' apparent laziness and general lack of enthusiasm 
for the cause of Irish liberty.32 Bartholomew Teeling, Humbert's 
aide-de-camp, remarked that "the country-people were very ill-behaved. 
(They) came in, got arms and clothes, and ran away. . .their sole object 
was plunder. (We) shot two of them."53 However, dissatisfaction was 
common on both sides. Many of the more educated volunteers that fought 
with the French expected to be treated with more respect and given a 
greater share of responsibility. They were "highly incensed at their new 
Allies, who,. . .placed them in the front ranks, and made them bear the 
whole brunt" of the fighting.34
While the French and their Irish partners desperately tried to 
overcome their differences to create a united front of opposition to 
British tyranny, many Anglo-Irish officials compared the crisis in 
Ireland to the state of affairs in North America in the 1770s. Charles 
James Fox, leader of the opposition in Parliament, had warned of the 
seriousness of any Irish rebellion as early as March 1797.55 However, 
once it began, both Irish and British officials hoped that the French 
would not get involved. While all agreed that "if the rebels should not 
have the co-operation of a French army," the British could "put them 
down" quite easily, "if the French should be able to throw a force of
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five thousand men on any part of our coasts, it would render the result 
very dubious."56
Naturally, the August 30, 1798 news of the arrival of French 
military forces on Irish soil was greeted by calls of alarm by those in 
London. Although British accounts of the landing of the estimated 800 
Frenchmen referred to it as a "petty invasion of Killala," many officials 
were worried nonetheless.57 The rebellion in Ireland was being 
suppressed quickly and successfully by the Anglo-Irish troops. It was
feared that this off-hand attempt made by the French to assist their
Irish comrades would only encourage new and more bloody insurrections all 
across the Irish countryside. They thought that "the enemy would be 
presented as much more powerful than he really was" and that "a 
confidence in French support," would "revive all the disorders which were 
nearly cured in the sister kingdom."58
In spite of Ireland's substantial military force, many in the
Anglo-Irish government recognized that additional help was needed. With
Humbert and his troops stationed in Killala, many feared that "unless 
Great Britain poured an immense force into Ireland the country would be 
lost."59 Not surprisingly, the British Parliament responded to such 
requests promptly and sent additional troops. The overall command was 
transferred from the hands of General Gerard Lake to those of General 
Charles Cornwallis. While Lake was regarded as a "brave, cool, collected 
man," he did not have the "resources adequate to the critical situation 
in which he was placed."60 In a conflict that often demanded 
guerilla-style tactics, a strong and decisive leader was needed. 
Cornwallis was appointed to the dual role of Lord Lieutenant and
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Commander in Chief of the military forces. As the replacement of both 
Lord Camden and General Lake, he had control of Ireland's civil and 
military affairs.61 The British recognized wisely "that the conspiracy 
which was being carried on in Ireland had 'to be treated in a different 
manner to an election mob or a drunken riot' in England."62
Meanwhile in Ireland, Humbert and his rag-tag group of Irish rebels 
marched southward from Killala. Their destination was Ireland's midland 
and eastern counties, where they hoped to unite with the other more 
organized and better supplied rebel forces. After the successful capture 
of Ballina (see maps 3 & 4), they marched onwards hurriedly in the hope 
of capturing as much territory as possible before a meeting with a large 
contingent of Anglo-Irish forces. While Humbert and the rebels marched 
from Ballina, 4,000 governmental troops under the command of Major 
General John Hely-Hutchinson (the commander of the government forces of 
the province) prepared to check the French at Castlebar (only 22 miles 
away from Killala, see maps 3 & 4). Hely-Hutchinson and his men were
waiting at Castlebar when Humbert's forces arrived. They came on with
/
enough "skill and elan" to initially scatter the Anglo-Irish forces. 
However, with Cornwallis and additional troops on the way, it was only a 
matter of time until the Franco-Irish rebels would be permanently 
defeated.63
In temporary control of Castlebar, Humbert and his men scrambled to 
set up a new civil administration for the province of Connach and to 
prepare for their next clash with the British forces. Although they 
desperately needed to raise recruits and supplies, there was little time 
left, for Cornwallis in command of Ireland's Grand Army, assisted by the
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forces of General Lake were fast approaching northeastward from Tuam (see 
map 4). Trapped in Castlebar, by September 1, Humbert and his men were 
on a quick retreat northwards into county Longford. In their hurry they 
left a considerable amount of artillery and ammunition behind, and relied 
upon stolen horses for much of their transportation. After eight days 
and several encounters with the Anglo-Irish troops that left a reported 
1500 rebels and Frenchmen dead, Humbert and his 96 officers and 748 
privates finally surrendered to Cornwallis at Ballinamuch in County 
Leitrum on September 9, 1798 (see maps 3 & 4).64 As General Humbert and 
many of the French officers were led away as prisoners of the British 
- government, the rebellion appeared to be over.
1798 was indeed a memorable year for the people of Ireland. With 
nearly 50,000 Irishmen dead, including many non-combatants, the rebellion 
had ravaged or destroyed vast areas of Ireland's eastern, northern, and 
southern counties.65 As the revolt that was designed by the United 
Irishmen to lead to the creation of a fully independent republic, the 
rebellion of 1798 came to a quick and disappointing end only several 
months after it began with Humbert's surrender to the British at 
Ballinamuch. While events of 1798 demonstrated only too clearly the 
incompetence and disorganization of the United Irish-French 
"partnership," more importantly, the revolt had sharply illustrated to 
the Anglo-Irish authorities that Protestant and Catholic Irishmen could 
put aside their differences temporarily and assemble themselves into a 
formidable anti-British coalition. It remained to be decided in the 
future whether the British authorities would award the Irish a new amount 
of political and social respect, or whether they would punish the Irish
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for their efforts with more restrictions and fewer political rights than 
ever before.
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CHAPTER IV
Aftermath
The dramatic surrender of General Jean Humbert and his men to 
British General Cornwallis at Ballinamuck marked the symbolic end of the 
United Irishmen's seven-year struggle to transform Ireland into a fully 
independent republic. For the United Irishmen and their fellow rebels, 
the events of the three fateful months of 1798 were not only a great 
disappointment, but an even larger disaster. Because the rebellion of 
1798 never gained the momentum or widespread support necessary to make it 
a national rising, it was put down far faster and easier than anyone in 
Ireland, France, or Great Britain ever expected.
Despite its quick defeat, the revolt of 1798 cannot be regarded as a 
wholly unsuccessful episode in the histories of Ireland, France, or Great 
Britain. After all, it "was as stunning an event to contemporaries in 
Ireland as 1789 had been to French men and women in France.1" Although 
the insurrection lasted for a relatively brief period of time, its 
ramifications were felt for years to come in the future. In 1798, "the 
floor of organized society had collapsed" in Ireland, "and the 
established classes had suddenly awoken to the existence of passions and 
hatred which they had hitherto relegated comfortably to a primeval phase 
in Britain's conquest of Ireland" a few hundred years earlier.2
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Although General Humbert's squadron was not the last outside effort to 
revive the dying Irish rebellion of 1798, it was the only one to make a 
successful landing on the Irish coast. Two other failed attempts 
followed in the days after Humbert's surrender. One week after the 
decisive events of September 9, 1798, James Napper Tandy (a former United 
Irish leader in exile) and his "Northern Army of Avengers," landed at 
Rutland, a small island situated off the coast of Ireland's county 
Donegal (see map 3). Tandy as "Chef de Brigade" was accompanied aboard 
the French ship "Anacreon" by French General Jean Pierre Antoine Rey and 
60 other Irish exiles.3 Upon his arrival, Tandy anxiously "endeavoured, 
but with little success, to persuade the Fishermen of Rutland that he and 
his friends came to deliver them from their oppressors."4 To illustrate 
his intentions and win the support of his fellow countrymen, he issued 
two proclamations. Not surprisingly, "the fishermen continued 
unconvinced of their grievances, and the country people continued to hide 
in the mountains."5 Discouraged by their lack of response and sobered 
by the news of Humbert's fate, Tandy and his fellow exiles set sail the 
following day (September 17) on a return voyage to Dunkirk.
Napper Tandy was not alone in his last-ditch efforts to assist the 
Irish rebels. On September 16, 1798 Admiral Jean Bapiste Francois 
Bompard finally set sail from France with his squadron of six ships. 
Originally intended to be part of the French invasion forces accompanying 
General Humbert, Bompard, in command of the squadron overseen by General 
Hardy, had been held in port for nearly two months. Like Tandy, he was 
completely unaware of Humbert's surrender to the British at Ballinamuck. 
Therefore, it came as no surprise that Bompard's ship the "Hoche," with
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Theobald Volfe Tone aboard, was spotted and followed by a British ship 
soon after its departure. Following nearly a month of careful 
surveilance, Bompard and his 6 frigates were captured in mid-October by 
Sir J.B. Warren's squadron off Lough Swilly on Ireland's northwestern 
coast (see map 3).6 In London and Dublin, news of the capture of the 
"Hoche" was greeted with enthusiasm. Loyalists in Britain and Ireland 
were particularly pleased by reports that Theobald Wolfe Tone was among 
those crew members taken prisoner by the British. As "the ci-devant 
agent of the Popish Committee, founder of the United Irishmen, and root 
and source of all our (Ireland's) miseries for six years past,"7 it was 
a relief to many to know that Tone would cause no further unrest.
For those few men who remained active members of the Society of 
United Irishmen, the news of Tone’s capture and subsequent death was the 
final blow to any hopes that still remained of reviving the dying 
rebellion. While Humbert's surrender to Cornwallis had splintered the 
core of the organization and scattered what remained of its mass 
following, the death of one of its principal leaders (Tone), marked the 
unofficial end of the Society and its seven-year struggle for Irish 
independence. Despite any early military victories. The United Irishmen 
and their rebel supporters were firmly and unquestionably defeated by the 
Anglo-Irish forces. As the disastrous culmination to nearly a decade of 
careful planning and negotiating, "the fatal 'ninety-eight'," virtually 
destroyed the Society of United Irishmen.8
With Humbert and his fellow French soldiers held as captives of the 
British, the Anglo-Irish governments had regained control of the Irish 
countryside and were taking decisive action to subdue further
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insurrections. Not surprisingly, such events were catastrophic to the 
Society of United Irishmen. Although many members remained loyal to the 
principles and ideologies of their organization, none of the principal 
United Irish leaders remained active after 1798. While many men, (like 
Wolfe Tone) met their deaths at the hands of the British, many others sat 
in British or Irish prisons and waited uncertainly for news of their 
fate. Those men who remained free after the rebellion had wisely fled to 
safety in the United States or on the Continent. They hoped to avoid the 
court martial and certain death that possibly awaited them in Ireland.9
For those United Irishmen who had been directly involved in 
preparations for rebellion and negotiations with the French, the quick 
defeat of the rebels was a stunning blow to the morale of the Society. 
After all, the United Irishmen had acknowledged their needs for 
leadership, ammunition, and financial assistance from the very beginning 
and had gained the support of France to supply such shortcomings. Those 
men who organized the insurrection knew from their observations of events 
in America and France that "in a grand revolution there must be a 
division of labour." While "there must be some to speak, some to write, 
some to plan," there must also be "many to execute."10 The United 
Irishmen completely misjudged both the ability and the willingness of the 
great mass of their own people to rise against English social oppression 
and political domination. Although the United Irishmen had a sufficient 
number of men to speak, write, and plan for their revolution, they lacked 
the mass support of enough well-trained and ideologically devoted 
Irishmen to carry out their intentions.
Those Irishmen who did participate actively in the rebellion lacked
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the advantages of education and military training that their leaders and 
so many of the royalists possessed. In most areas of Ireland, as the 
French had painfully discovered, the Irish rebels lived "in a state of 
total ignorance and beggary."11 While most Irishmen could understand 
the basic reasons behind the calls to revolution, few could comprehend or 
identify with the many important and more complex political ideologies 
that formed the foundation of the rebellion. The events at Killala, best 
illustrated exactly how few rebels possessed the discipline and training 
needed to defeat the organized ranks of the Anglo-Irish military forces. 
While "their intrepidity was great, and their perserverance in the midst 
of fire and slaughter truly astonishing,. . .on every occasion it was 
obviously. . .not the leaders that spurred them into action."12 The 
United Irishmen could incite the rebels into action with inflamatory 
remarks about British oppression, but once on the battlefield, they could 
neither control nor organize their fighting ranks. While the rebels 
fought fiercely because they were motivated by anger, it took only a few 
defeats by the Anglo-Irish troops to convince them that it was time to 
quit and leave the cause behind.13
While the Society of United Irishmen was nearly destroyed by the 
rebellion of 1798, Humbert's surrender to Cornwallis publicly disgraced 
the French. Their humiliating defeat in Ireland was a great blow to 
French national confidence. When compounded by other disastrous defeats 
in the Mediterranean and Egypt, the events in Ireland appeared to be a 
prelude of events in the future. By the end of 1798, Ireland had been 
the destination of four failed French military expeditions. While Banty 
Bay could be overlooked as an isolated incident of 1796, the French could
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not deny the consective defeats or failures of Humbert, Tandy, and 
Bompard. Despite their own lack of foresight and improper planning, the 
French generally reacted to the news of Humbert's surrender with anger 
and disappointment. Many Frenchmen, particularly members of Humbert's 
defeated invasion forces, publicly denounced the Irish, their rebellion, 
and most importantly, French involvement in such an unworthy foreign 
cause.14
The defeat and capture of General Humbert was particularly 
humiliating for the French. Those Frenchmen who accompanied Humbert on 
the invasion of Killala were astonished by the contrast between their 
expectations and the reality of the Irish situation. Many of the French 
officers were accustomed to certain basic standards of living, 
cleanliness, and education. In western Ireland, (and particularly the 
region of County Mayo) the French were met by a peasant population of 
semi-savages.13 The Irishmen were uninformed of the rebellion raging in 
the east and its importance to the future of their nation. Frustrated by 
the apparently lazy and idle nature of the Irish, the French found 
relatively few recruits willing to fight with them. Many of the men who 
landed at Killala, felt that "they had been completely deceived as to the 
state of Ireland" by those United Irishmen in Paris. Encouraged by the 
reports of the early rebel successes, "They had expected to find the 
people in open rebellion, or, at least,. . .organized for insurrection; 
but to their dismay, they found only ragamuffins,. . .who, in joining 
their standard, did them infinitely more harm than good."16
In an effort to explain and justify their defeat, the French blamed 
the leaders of the United Irishmen for their false assessments of
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Ireland's strength and dedication to the cause. The United Irishmen did 
after all, misjudge both the quality and quantity of their rebel
supporters. However, French interest in an Irish invasion was motivated
entirely by military and political considerations. From the start of 
negotiations in 1793, the United Irishmen had stressed their desire to 
create a totally independent republic through a large-scale rebellion 
against England. The French were willing to supply the Irish with the 
needed men, munitions, and money, but they did so in the hopes of 
destroying the British and retaining a strong influence upon Ireland. 
Despite the inflamatory rhetoric that Humbert and Tandy used to try to 
incite the Irish masses into revolt, the French had little real interest
in promoting the political ideals of liberty and justice. Most French
officers involved, regarded the Irish with an unrestrained contempt.
They called the rebels "beggars, rascals, and savages" and "cursed 
without scruple their own Directory, for sending them, after they 
had, . . .conquered the world, to be beaten in an Irish bog." Many 
Frenchmen agreed with those of their fellow countrymen who swore that 
"they would never return to a country, where they could find neither 
bread, wine, nor discipline; and where the people lived on roots, 
whiskey, and lying."17
While the French suffered through the humiliating defeat of Humbert, 
loyalists across Britain and Ireland heaved a sigh of relief over 
Cornwallis' victory at Ballinamuck. This appeared to be the dramatic 
conclusion to a rebellion that had been the source of considerable fear 
and concern for the Anglo-Irish governments, even though many small-scale 
agrarian conflicts in the Irish countryside continued for the next
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several years. The British government, Cornwallis, and Castlereagh (as 
Lord Lieutanent and Chief Secretary of Ireland) faced the difficult task 
of restoring peace and tranquility to a country torn apart by 
insurrection. Fearful of repercussions, Cornwallis and Castlereagh 
wisely agreed upon a policy of '"firmness and leniency*” in Ireland.18 
While many of the rebel leaders would be punished, they decided to pardon 
those, "who had not been ringleaders in this rebellion; and who, 
repenting of their folly, were desirous to return to their allegiance, 
and to their peaceable duties."19
For those United Irish leaders who remained in state prisons, the 
British passed the Banishment Act in the summer of 1798. Agreed upon 
after negotiations with the state prisoners, this act was a compromise 
measure that offered something for both sides. From among the imprisoned 
United Irish leaders, several were selected to testify in front of a 
Parliamentary committee on the activities and intentions of their 
organization, as well as their connections with the French government.
In exchange for such information, the Anglo-Irish government would allow 
them to emigrate to another country, freed from prosecution.20 Thomas 
Addis Emmet, William MacNevin, and Arthur O'Connor were among those 
prisoners chosen to testify before the secret committee. Although their 
testimony was complete, their departure from Ireland was delayed. Many 
United Irishs leaders were allowed to leave in early 1799, but those who 
testified were detained for political reasons. After they spent three 
years in a Scottish prison, they were finally allowed to move to the 
United States.21
Although many of those directly involved in the rebellion were
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pardoned or exiled, many other Irishmen were tried and convicted in the 
state courts or before military tribunals. Moderation prevailed in the 
treatment of most rebels, but discipline was necessary if peace was to be 
restored. After all, the rebellion of 1798 frightened Anglo-Irish 
officials. While it was put down quite easily, this large-scale revolt 
of Ireland's masses was exactly what the British had feared for 
decades.22 Although it should have come as no surprise considering that 
"nowhere else the British went,. . ,,did they treat the native 
inhabitants so severely, exploit them so ruthlessly, and display such a 
callous lack of concern for the results of their policies," the rebellion 
greatly undermined the power of British authority in Ireland.23 The 
Irish were theoretically fellow countrymen of the British, but they were 
rarely accorded such respect. It was "only the Irish use of force, of 
violence so passionately strong as to threaten British ascendancy," 
during the rebellion of 1798 "that finally induced the. . .British to 
reexamine their Irish policies."24
As the Irish people recovered from the tumultuous effects of 
insurrection, the Anglo-Irish governments began plans for sweeping 
political reforms in Ireland. Later culminating in the Irish Act of 
Union in 1801, these changes would give Irishmen greater political clout 
and social responsibility within the larger British empire. To 
governmental officials in Britain and Ireland, the rebellion of 1798 had 
only too clearly illustrated the desperate need for political and social 
change in Ireland, if it was to remain an integral part of the British 
Isles.
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